Derailment at Ealing Broadway 2/3/2016 (and RAIB report)

Even trackernet in regards to points is not correct at all sites. As 95% of the points are self normalising this does not reflect correctly on trackernet and will only show the correct position of the points when the route has been called for and cleared.

As Tut says the regulators at Earls Court were never intended to operate the sites except for emergencies and testing out sites in engineering hours. And as they got Route Buttons and not physical levers why would they need Point indications? The non safety circuits which control all this does it all for them.

There is different rules for manually operated frames such as route card working in where a signal operator can authorise a train under failure conditions as they can see point indications and the position of the levers.

As a recently recruited T/Op, I have to say that before reading the report, I had never before heard the term slip points. I'm sure it was never mentioned at training school and i don't recall coming across them in the rule book. I shall make a point of doing some research of them now though!

How can it be "flat out wrong"? You have even just quoted two contradictory statements (i.e that the Service Controller MUST give instruction on what points need securing and that two people MUST AGREE on what points need securing". Obviously one of your assertions of the Rule Book is nonsense.

All I have to add that if someone tells me to secure points in anything other than a position that I am 100% happy will not detail a passenger train then I am off the job. And I wouldn't give a damn what your rule book said. Please sort yourself out.

Thank you for your Rule Book post. It certainly makes interesting reading. and I genuinely thank you for it.

However the person actually "on the ground" making the path safe must surely make himself satisfied that he has understood the environs of his station and know what he is doing, and know when the signaller/controller is talking nonsense.

As has been said, no-one comes out of this with any credit whatsoever. They all should think of a career in another industry IMHO. Any of them that wants to state "I was right" can look at the train in the ditch and should know that they were wrong.

Tut many thanks now I understand, I think the programme machines were explained to me before but I had forgotten. It is a great system, but in event of track circuit failure I presume the route setting buttons would be stopped from working by the interlocking? Making it more difficult to run any train over that section.


The railway rule books are a historical document i.e. they are based upon over 150 years of running railways. Historically the Signalman is in charge of all movements, as he would be in the best position to make the safety critical decision. The people on the ground would not always have all the information to hand, they are to follow instructions...

All in all no one was injured so the various layers of safety based rules have worked well, O.K. we have a couple of small errors that have caused a train and point to be damaged.  But running a railway is not the same as playing with a model railway, at 12inch to the foot scale we do not have a hand of God to reach in and we have the safety of the passengers and staff to think about.

It is all very well to state that more training is the answer, but do we really want to go back to having Station Masters, station foreman, hand signalman etc. hanging around in offices and mess rooms at each station ready for the very few occasions that they are now needed on the modern railway.

N.B. Slip points  hmm. this could mean a number of things!

The RAIB isn't fully clear on this. The versions of the *controller's diagrams* on the intranet are the official, up-to-date, versions. They certainly should be able to be regarded as reliable, and if they're not then it's a very serious issue indeed (very serious). However, we don't know if the service manager had accessed the correct site on the intranet, as it would certainly be possible to find other outdated diagrams if he hadn't looked in the correct place. My suggestions would be the latter is what happened.



If I knew I had accessed the correct diagrams, then yes I would be 100% positive. However, if I wasn't then I certainly wouldn't be authorising any train movement until the situation has been clarified. I think in the circumstances I would have waited until a manager was on site, unless it was a Station Supervisor known to me and who I knew was fully confident.

That's easy when you're well trained and experienced. Anyone will tell you that as a relatively new/inexperienced member of staff it's much more difficult to challenge others.

No problem, if you'd like to know more, there is a truly excellent history and discussion here which I thoroughly recommend.


Yes, I believe so, but then that would be true in a power signal box too - and a modern IECC or ROC, for that matter - wouldn't it?

Thanks for the link... how I will have to find some time to sit down and have a good read.


But if you had indications for the points and locks, could you not call up the driver and authorise him past the signal if the route was correct and not obstructed by a train? just as you could in a mechanical box. (Rule 81(l) in 1950 BR Rule book)

A track circuit failure would prevent you from pulling off the signal, but may still give you control over the points and locks as long as they are not part of the failed track circuit.  The Locking diagram should tell you what you can do. 

N.B. I know LU has its own rule book with differences to the BR version, but I was trained on the BR, and have long forgotten most of the list of differences I was given when I spent a couple of weekend on LU.

This is exactly my view North End.


The Rule Book as it stands may have been very useful when the signal cabin was at of the platform, now it's 15 miles away and a computer it sounds as if it could do with an update. 

If one can get to the grade of Station Manager without understanding how points work around your place of work then that is a failing of the railway.

You, I, or anybody else agreeing that the station supervisor should be responsible for identifying which points need to be secured and in which position, that the station supervisor should be trained to carry out this task, that the station supervisor should have access to the information required to carry out this task, that the station supervisor (regardless of his formal responsibilities) should in any case take it upon himself to walk the route and check the points are in the correct position, should be able to read routes, should be the one to authorise a train past a signal at danger or anything else is not the same as the person on the ground having the responsibility of ensuring that the physical path is safe for the single train into a single platform, nor does it mean that they have failed in any wise to carry out their responsibilities. The responsibilities of the relevant parties are not ordained by you or me on an enthusiast's forum, they are laid out by the company in the rule book.

Now if what you want to say is, I think LUL should do things differently and should vest responsibility for identifying which points need to be secured and securing the route in the station supervisor, okay, people can have a discussion about that.

If what you want to say is, although maybe not required, I myself would probably have walked the route and made sure a route was correctly set for the train, then alright. Fine. I think that might have been wise too, but then I wasn't at Ealing Broadway on that evening. Just like you, I don't know what kind of knowledge the station supervisor had. I don't know how difficult or easy the conditions were on that night. I don't know how much pressure for a speedy resolution was on the supervisor, I don't know how the conversations between the supervisor and others went. And I don't think there's an especially useful or productive discussion to be had about that. But if I wasn't insistent on having it, I would certainly be a bit more polite and humble.

If, though, what you want to say is that the supervisor had the responsibility of ensuring that the physical path is safe for the single train into a single platform then you're still just as wrong as you were before.

Supervisors seem to move about between so many stations now, this must dilute their knowledge and make mistakes more likely.

Actually, closer inspection of the diagram panels in Earl's Court will reveal that the normal position of all points are shown. However, the new diagram panels are not as clear in this regard as previous ones were, and it is easy to overlook.