Signalling system fault - Nov 26

It's a signalling failure, I think between Paddington and Bond Street. One staff member said they heard the phrase "worst signalling failure we've ever seen" from a Siemens engineer.

Crossrail Central Operating Section

A raw deal of course for affected passengers today but undeniably the safest option given the extent of the issues that are being investigated. You really do not want to play Canute when the integrity of systems is being called into question.

Tells you a lot that the look on the passengers this morning was disbelief rather than anything else. We don't expect it to break...

Limited services in the core have begun running as of 10:30.

Have they tried turning it off and on again?

What a mess - has anything like this happened on any other services here in London? (exception, DLR during 1990s upgrading when the system became the Docklands Light Failway because of the problems)

Too much AI, too much use of public internet??

The day LU uses AI for safety critical decisions is the day I limit myself to walking/buses/taxis.

Tom Thank goodness for that - it may be cheaper (headline £costs) to use public telecoms etc infrastructure I see this as extremely risky for something as critical as train control, etc.

I did read once of a tram system in Italy where it was said that a hacker had somehow managed to infiltrate the system and was able to change points where routes diverge. Possibly more too - its probable that the full details were kept out of the public domain, in case it encouraged others to try to do the same.

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I will admit that when a teenage schoolboy (in the 1970s) I wished that I could influence train operations - so that Hammersmith & City trains travelling to Barking would no longer have to wait what seemed like ages whilst two or even three Upminster-bound District line trains which arrived on the scene after it were allowed to enter Aldgate East before the train I was on.

I am not a railway engineer but I am involved in cybersecurity, so what I can say is that best practice involves having a safety critical network fully air-gapped from the Internet and even other networks in the organisation, so no traffic in or out, and then to use hardware 'diodes' to allow small amounts of specific information to make their way across the gap in one direction only, so things like real time passenger information can be provided on the Internet etc., for apps.

The servers operating the ticket machines and gate-lines will be on another separate network, as will the passenger information system. These don't have to be quite as well separated as they aren't considered quite as safety critical as the signalling system but they'll still be segregated private networks.

Obviously there have been instances where certain operators have failed to meet these standards, and so there have been hacking incidents where people were able to affect operational railways, but this is very uncommon. TfL's network infrastructure teams are very good from what I gather so I'm sure they are doing what they should!

Regarding segregation of systems - In these days where remote access for diagnostics and monitoring is generally required it is very tricky  !!
Recent example with the Airtraffic control system (where system support was remote)

Three months after the cyber-attack, some FoI replies are now saying that access to statistics is not yet available, and applicant should ask again in six months' time! Presumably, to be sure of access, and avoid a rush of reapplications in a month or two, but that is allowing nine months for things to get straight again!

ai has no real intelligence. it's just probability of the output result being most likely based on the prompt.