RAIB report: train door incident at Bank 06/02/2017

Well that's a nice one to quote to the Daily Failers next time there's a strike about dispatch methods and safety critical second staffing. Thank you!

The DLR trains date from around 2007, just before the Sensitive Edge systems were introduced with the 2009 Tube Stock on the Victoria Line.

The current fleet consists of 149 units, of which about a third date from 2007. Specifically, 23 x B90 stock, 47 x B92 stock, 24 x B2K stock, and 55 x B07 stock. (The numerical part of the type code indicates the date of introduction). The original P86 and P89 stock (21 units) were moved to Essen in the late 1990s.

From the report

11. The train involved was scheduled to depart from Bank station at 21:30 hrs and travel to Lewisham. This service was part of a planned series of journeys known as Run 215 and it was operated by a train formed from three cars, numbers 109, 138 and 128. Car 109 was leading at the time of the incident.

12. Train services on DLR are operated using two different types of cars. The older cars, introduced in stages between 1991 and 2001, are designated B90, B92 or B2K. The newer cars, of the type involved in the incident, are designated as B2007 and were introduced from 2008 (figure 2). All of the current DLR rolling stock was constructed by Bombardier Transportation. Each car comprises two individual vehicles, which are articulated

You could be right

23 The passenger, who was directly involved in this incident, entered platform 9 from the Northern Line Steps at 21:29:50 hrs. She recognised that the train standing in the platform was the one she needed to catch for her destination, and moved towards it with the intention of boarding the train through the leading door

The PSA was operating the doors from the Emergency Driving Position (i.e. the bit at the front of the train) rather than from one of the Door Control Panels because they believed there was an unspecified fault with the Automatic Operation.  The report says....

54 To allow observation of the platform and doors of a three-car train at platform 9 at Bank station, two CCTV monitor screens are provided for the use of PSAs located at the EDP. The monitors are located at the entrance to the tunnel at the eastern end of the station. One screen shows an image of the eastern end of the platform and the train. The second screen shows a similar image from the western end of the platform

55 The camera showing the image from the eastern end was incorrectly angled. The effect of this defect was that the image shown on the CCTV monitor did not show the leading door (figure 9). As a result, this door and the adjacent platform area could not be observed by a PSA when located at the EDP.


56 The RAIB has been unable to establish what caused the camera to be incorrectly angled or when it became so. Following the incident, the camera was angled to show the leading door (figure 10). The management of the CCTV system defect at platform 9 is discussed further at paragraph 68.

Now here's where it gets fun.  The incident occurred on 6 February 2017 but the defect was reported back on 7 November 2016 following an inspection by KAD's "mirrors and monitors" team.  On 28 November 2016 a KAD communications technician turned up but as the CCTV camera is an LUL asset he wasn't authorised to adjust the direction it was pointing. His report said that he ‘reset monitor via fused spur’, and ‘Screen working correctly. No further action’ and the item was closed.  There was no further inspection until after the incident.

I guess because the PSAs rarely used the EDP they didn't notice that one of the CCTV cameras at Bank was wonky and not covering all the doors

The first is fairly obvious, how much would it cost to fit sensitive edge door systems to 149 DLR trains including the ones that were built between 1991 and 2001?  Not cheap I'd imagine.

As for the second who's job is it to check the monitors on the DLR platforms at Bank, the LUL station staff or the DLR's "mirrors and monitor" team?

It says in the report "69 LUL owns the CCTV system on the DLR platforms at Bank station. However, KAD is responsible for the detection of defects and, in some cases, the rectification works." so its DLR responsibility to inspect the cameras not the LUL station staff

The report did effectively say to make sure the new trains have sensitive edge or something similar.

I'm aware of that. It just seems like a fairly obvious good idea / best practice.

I'd guess that because its so rare that PSAs operate the doors from the EDP and the "mirrors and monitors" team inspections are only a few times every year that the DLR management didn't think it was worthwhile

The cameras are LUL assets so LUL technicians would carry out any maintenance, repairs, etc. but inspections are carried out by the DLR's "mirrors and monitors" team not the LUL station staff at Bank

As a frequent traveller on DLR trains, I wouldn't say that it was either "rare" for the EDP to be used, but it's not something you see on every or probably even most trips either.

That's no excuse for shoddily adjusted cameras and poor maintenance procedures. I can't believe they'd close a job when the fault hadn't been dealt with. OK, actually I can because it happens all the time, but it shouldn't.