Crossrail 2 Consultation

Seems his political malevolence knows no bounds. That's rather worse than I had ever imagined if he's tried to faff around with the NLE. Obviously there are commercial issues there but they stem from a decision by the developer not TfL. The Met Line Ext doesn't surprise me as the politics there have long been horrible and it takes little imagination to see why portraying the Mayor as "villain" is fair game for Tory ministers. I can't see TfL collapsing financially - the situation is not good and may worsen but there are things that TfL could do to raise income / cut costs. However your comments do fit in with recent "issues" over the SoS not allowing traffic fines to be increased and also the problems re road network funding and more discussions with the DfT being needed. Those "issues" can certainly be seen in the context of worsening TfL's financial position. If we muse for a moment about a "TfL collapse" then the only place the problem actually lands is the DfT and Treasury, not the Mayor as the ultimate responsibility for a load of issues relating to TfL's operation rest with the Secretary of State. I can't see government really wanting that nightmare to land on the plate with the concomitant political fall out and outrage from passengers.

Scrabbling back "on topic" the prospects for CR2 are certainly well into negative territory with all of the above. No way can London raise its 50% share of the cost and certainly not "up front" which is what the SoS has apparently requested.

The scenario is not so much that the DfT actually wants TfL under its control; its that the SofS wants an 'excuse' to mask his taking away control of TfL from the Mayor.  This appears to be (to those inside in the know) a process to enable the justification of 'rescuing TfL from financial mismanagement'.

The irony of that is staggering given what has happened to national debt over the past 8-10 years, and other public institution's financial woes such as local government and the NHS. Surely the government has enough broken things to fix under its control* without taking on other agency's' problems...

However, devising and pushing such a narrative makes complete sense, as it would be designed to play into the pre existing beliefs of those who would like to believe financial mismanagement exists anyway. I believe I smell smoke, so we're going to set a fire to ensure we are right.

Reverting rapidly to topic..

I have just ploughed through this very long and occasionally painfully accurate thread. The inevitable conclusion is that CR2 is “at least for now” a lost cause, “needed” arguably, but seemingly too politically unwelcome/unaffordable at present.

If that is indeed the inevitable direction of travel, then if nothing else, I hope the CR2 project team is given enough time to ensure its findings are properly documented and shut down so that the planning work done so far, is not simply thrown away. Just in case actual passenger growth eventually demonstrates that “arguable need” has become a palpable need.

If we step away from politics, the elephant in the room is just how much extra capacity will CR2 really add?

The underlying Crossrail “theory” implies that most of the “extra capacity” will come from utilising the contra-peak flow “empty seats” from terminal stations and eliminating the rolling stock and line capacity lost when reversing services at terminal stations.

I am not the first person to ponder how this will pan out in practice (others far more learned than I have warned that Elizabeth Line will be full almost immediately) so perhaps there may be a case for delaying any commitment to spades on the ground until we at least see how Elizabeth(CR1) works in practice.

In truth Thameslink already provides a prototype for how it might work. One where the theory is fine but the intensity of services is such that one failure in the core section can quickly cause havoc not just on the Thameslink route but can bottle up traffic across junctions and impact services on adjacent routes quickly leaving some commuters with no credible alternative access to the city. Those risks seem even higher with the CR2 plans when you factor in the hideously complex service patterns implicit with servicing the tangle of South West London lines which it is suggested will feed into CR2.

I suspect politicians of all persuasions have been busily pressing for “their route” to benefit from CR2 services especially if it means constituents enjoy new rolling stock. But it seems the law of unforeseen consequences is far more likely to rear its ugly head the more stuff gets bolted onto a simple idea and the more complex a system becomes. To my untrained eye, CR2 is no longer just a single NE-SW link and has burgeoned to become a horrendous tangle with far too many common mode failure points to offer passengers consistent and reliable services.

would be interested to know exactly how far outside the core it starts sharing.