Post by piccadillypilot on May 1, 2005 18:32:11 GMT
From Modern Railways August 1963
Collision near Victoria, LT.E.
The driver of a London Transport District Line train who took his train forward without sufficient care after passing a stop signal at danger under "stop and proceed" rules, must accept the responsibility for the subsequent collision with the train ahead on November 22 last (1962), concludes Col. D. McMullen in his report (H.M.S.O.3s). The accident occurred on the eastbound District Line track between Victoria and St. James's Park stations and followed a signal failure 15min earlier at the latter station. The line is fully track-circuited and the signalsare London Transport's standard colour-light two-aspect stop signals, all of which were working automatically at the time of the accident. "Trip" apparatus is provided at all stop signals, whereby an arm on the ground apparatus engages a trip cock on the train and the brakes are applied automatically. The signalling circuits include detection in the trip arm of the ground apparatus to ensure that it is intact and working correctly and it was the fracture of the detection arm on the second of the St. James's Park home signals that caused this and the two previous stop signals to remain at danger. Trains were therefore working past the signals affected under "stop and proceed" regulations. In this, the driver is authorised, after a one-minute wait at the signal, to "trip" past it and, after resetting the trip cock on the train, to proceed cautiously as far as the line is clear, ready to stop short of any obstruction, or to the next signal, where, if it is at danger, the procedure may be repeated. Because of slow running caused by the initial signal failure, trains were beginning to close up to each other and were suffering signal checks at Victoria and its approaches; in several cases the "stop and proceed" rule was applied there. Both the trains involved in the subsequent collision�No. 44, Haling Broadway to Mansion House, and No. 45, Wimbledon to Dagenham�had arrived at Victoria after "tripping" past two or more of the seven home signals. Train 44 "tripped" past the starting signal at Victoria and proceeded slowly to the intermediate signal between Victoria and St. James's Park, which was at danger. The driver was preparing to "trip" past this also when train 45, which had "tripped" past the Victoria starter, ran into the pack of train 44. The driver of train 45 claimed in evidence that an inspector told him that it was the starter that was believed to have failed and to pass it and proceed at caution. He said he thought he was travelling slowly when he saw the outline of the tram ahead about half a coach-length away. He released the dead-man's handle to apply the brake, but was positive he did not see the light of a tail lamp. Other witnesses stated that the train accelerated as though leaving a station normally. The driver of train 44 removed the traction current by pinching together the tunnel telephone wires but could not communicate with the traffic controller on the "Drico" (driver-cpntroller) telephone (a portable telephone clipped to the tunnel telephone wires) because the guard had removed the auxiliary key from the guard's control panel, which rendered the "Drico" system inoperative. The report reveals a lack of liaison between the senior station staff and the traffic controller in assessing and reporting details of the accident, in detraining passengers (which was begun without the authority of the stationmaster or the controller), delay in detraining passengers from following trains, and the premature removal of traction current from the South Kensington-Victoria section by the Victoria stationmaster without consulting the controller.
Training in stop-and-proceed
Col. McMullen emphasises the need for a driver to exercise care and judgment when trains are working under "stop and proceed" regulations to ensure that the train can stop short of any obstruction. He adds that a driver may not exercise anyjudgment on the cause of a signal remaining at danger or on the need for proceeding cautiously after passing it; the driver of train 45 failed in the latter respect. Col. McMullen also endorses Col. W. P. Reed's recommendations in his report on the Watford collision (summarised in our June issue) that drivers should receive practical instruction in the application of "stop and proceed" regulations. He criticises the poor tail lamp indications on train 44; the lenses of both electric and oil lamps were so dirty that the lights could barely be seen. Notice has been taken of this maintenance failure and of the lack of supervision and Col. McMullen reveals that London Transport has developed a portable battery-operated flashing tail lamp which is to undergo trials on the Northern City Line; it will, it is hoped, replace the remaining oil-lit tail lamps on L.T. trains. Col. McMullen also comments on the failure in communication, particularly of the "Drico" telephone. This system has been installed at considerable expense to enable train crews to communicate with the traffic controller in the event of a breakdown or accident, but as in a previous accident, the system was rendered ineffective just when it was needed by the unwitting action of the guards, both of whom had only short service. Col. McMullen feels that the methods of guard's training need to be reviewed in the light of these circumstances. The whole question of communication between train crews and control offices is also to be reviewed. Arrangements are also in hand to hold courses for senior staff to ensure that stationmasters and others are aware of action to be taken in the event of an accident. Finally Col. McMullen feels that a doctor should invariably be called to an accident; in this case, although ambulances had been called, a doctor was not summoned to injured passengers.
Collision near Victoria, LT.E.
The driver of a London Transport District Line train who took his train forward without sufficient care after passing a stop signal at danger under "stop and proceed" rules, must accept the responsibility for the subsequent collision with the train ahead on November 22 last (1962), concludes Col. D. McMullen in his report (H.M.S.O.3s). The accident occurred on the eastbound District Line track between Victoria and St. James's Park stations and followed a signal failure 15min earlier at the latter station. The line is fully track-circuited and the signalsare London Transport's standard colour-light two-aspect stop signals, all of which were working automatically at the time of the accident. "Trip" apparatus is provided at all stop signals, whereby an arm on the ground apparatus engages a trip cock on the train and the brakes are applied automatically. The signalling circuits include detection in the trip arm of the ground apparatus to ensure that it is intact and working correctly and it was the fracture of the detection arm on the second of the St. James's Park home signals that caused this and the two previous stop signals to remain at danger. Trains were therefore working past the signals affected under "stop and proceed" regulations. In this, the driver is authorised, after a one-minute wait at the signal, to "trip" past it and, after resetting the trip cock on the train, to proceed cautiously as far as the line is clear, ready to stop short of any obstruction, or to the next signal, where, if it is at danger, the procedure may be repeated. Because of slow running caused by the initial signal failure, trains were beginning to close up to each other and were suffering signal checks at Victoria and its approaches; in several cases the "stop and proceed" rule was applied there. Both the trains involved in the subsequent collision�No. 44, Haling Broadway to Mansion House, and No. 45, Wimbledon to Dagenham�had arrived at Victoria after "tripping" past two or more of the seven home signals. Train 44 "tripped" past the starting signal at Victoria and proceeded slowly to the intermediate signal between Victoria and St. James's Park, which was at danger. The driver was preparing to "trip" past this also when train 45, which had "tripped" past the Victoria starter, ran into the pack of train 44. The driver of train 45 claimed in evidence that an inspector told him that it was the starter that was believed to have failed and to pass it and proceed at caution. He said he thought he was travelling slowly when he saw the outline of the tram ahead about half a coach-length away. He released the dead-man's handle to apply the brake, but was positive he did not see the light of a tail lamp. Other witnesses stated that the train accelerated as though leaving a station normally. The driver of train 44 removed the traction current by pinching together the tunnel telephone wires but could not communicate with the traffic controller on the "Drico" (driver-cpntroller) telephone (a portable telephone clipped to the tunnel telephone wires) because the guard had removed the auxiliary key from the guard's control panel, which rendered the "Drico" system inoperative. The report reveals a lack of liaison between the senior station staff and the traffic controller in assessing and reporting details of the accident, in detraining passengers (which was begun without the authority of the stationmaster or the controller), delay in detraining passengers from following trains, and the premature removal of traction current from the South Kensington-Victoria section by the Victoria stationmaster without consulting the controller.
Training in stop-and-proceed
Col. McMullen emphasises the need for a driver to exercise care and judgment when trains are working under "stop and proceed" regulations to ensure that the train can stop short of any obstruction. He adds that a driver may not exercise anyjudgment on the cause of a signal remaining at danger or on the need for proceeding cautiously after passing it; the driver of train 45 failed in the latter respect. Col. McMullen also endorses Col. W. P. Reed's recommendations in his report on the Watford collision (summarised in our June issue) that drivers should receive practical instruction in the application of "stop and proceed" regulations. He criticises the poor tail lamp indications on train 44; the lenses of both electric and oil lamps were so dirty that the lights could barely be seen. Notice has been taken of this maintenance failure and of the lack of supervision and Col. McMullen reveals that London Transport has developed a portable battery-operated flashing tail lamp which is to undergo trials on the Northern City Line; it will, it is hoped, replace the remaining oil-lit tail lamps on L.T. trains. Col. McMullen also comments on the failure in communication, particularly of the "Drico" telephone. This system has been installed at considerable expense to enable train crews to communicate with the traffic controller in the event of a breakdown or accident, but as in a previous accident, the system was rendered ineffective just when it was needed by the unwitting action of the guards, both of whom had only short service. Col. McMullen feels that the methods of guard's training need to be reviewed in the light of these circumstances. The whole question of communication between train crews and control offices is also to be reviewed. Arrangements are also in hand to hold courses for senior staff to ensure that stationmasters and others are aware of action to be taken in the event of an accident. Finally Col. McMullen feels that a doctor should invariably be called to an accident; in this case, although ambulances had been called, a doctor was not summoned to injured passengers.
