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Post by snoggle on Jul 10, 2014 11:11:04 GMT
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Post by Deleted on Jul 10, 2014 19:17:30 GMT
They have never learnt since the Jubilee line in the 90's
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Post by railtechnician on Jul 11, 2014 6:23:35 GMT
They have never learnt since the Jubilee line in the 90's I am in no way surprised, I see much glossing over incompetence at the highest echelons of LUL which is explained away in a language meant to be beyond the comprehension of the average reader so as not to tarnish the corporate image. This is what happens when the technical evaluation and decision making control process is wrested from competent engineers and technical experts and placed in the hands of accountants who know the cost of everything but the value of very little. Back in the day LT experts were knowledgeable experienced technically competent advisers to railways around the world as London Transport International. I have no doubt that if that arm of the company had not been disbanded it would have had provided competent and proper input to what was very obviously a flawed procurement process. The final nail in the coffin of engineering efficiency was a direct result of the transfer of control from engineers to accountants after the King's Cross Fire. Of course the fire was an accident waiting to happen as a result of chronic under investment by successive governments and incompetent politicians and further political vandalism led to the disastrous PPP which considerably devalued services to the travelling public for years while making it and taxpayers pay more and more for the privilege.
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Post by whistlekiller2000 on Jul 11, 2014 6:46:14 GMT
They have never learnt since the Jubilee line in the 90's I am in no way surprised, I see much glossing over incompetence at the highest echelons of LUL which is explained away in a language meant to be beyond the comprehension of the average reader so as not to tarnish the corporate image. This is what happens when the technical evaluation and decision making control process is wrested from competent engineers and technical experts and placed in the hands of accountants who know the cost of everything but the value of very little. Back in the day LT experts were knowledgeable experienced technically competent advisers to railways around the world as London Transport International. I have no doubt that if that arm of the company had not been disbanded it would have had provided competent and proper input to what was very obviously a flawed procurement process. The final nail in the coffin of engineering efficiency was a direct result of the transfer of control from engineers to accountants after the King's Cross Fire. Of course the fire was an accident waiting to happen as a result of chronic under investment by successive governments and incompetent politicians and further political vandalism led to the disastrous PPP which considerably devalued services to the travelling public for years while making it and taxpayers pay more and more for the privilege. I've seen similar behaviour from many large organisations. An almost religious obsession with procuring the lowest price tender offered regardless of technical proficiency, due - as RT quite rightly says, to the process being almost entirely influenced by accountants with little input from those who actually understand what they're talking about. On a couple of occasions I knew about heads of IT technical departments being excluded from the final procurement decisions because it was known they favoured the best solution offered......which in both cases whilst affordable, were unfortunately (although understandably) the most expensive. The cheapest solutions were purchased in both cases, one company folding within a month of commissioning leaving an utter shambles and the other (rather embarrassingly) having to seek help from the previous incumbent as they lacked the experience to merge their solution into the existing system.
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Post by Deleted on Jul 11, 2014 18:57:38 GMT
They have never learnt since the Jubilee line in the 90's I am in no way surprised, I see much glossing over incompetence at the highest echelons of LUL which is explained away in a language meant to be beyond the comprehension of the average reader so as not to tarnish the corporate image. This is what happens when the technical evaluation and decision making control process is wrested from competent engineers and technical experts and placed in the hands of accountants who know the cost of everything but the value of very little. Back in the day LT experts were knowledgeable experienced technically competent advisers to railways around the world as London Transport International. I have no doubt that if that arm of the company had not been disbanded it would have had provided competent and proper input to what was very obviously a flawed procurement process. The final nail in the coffin of engineering efficiency was a direct result of the transfer of control from engineers to accountants after the King's Cross Fire. Of course the fire was an accident waiting to happen as a result of chronic under investment by successive governments and incompetent politicians and further political vandalism led to the disastrous PPP which considerably devalued services to the travelling public for years while making it and taxpayers pay more and more for the privilege. I'm not in any way suggesting the report is perfect but your view is quite as one sided as the report you criticise. The reality is that there are plenty of knowledgeable and experienced engineers and operators in London Underground still. LTI is a bit of a red herring (though I do think LU should still be selling its skills around the world). Many of the people who have left have taken a big packet of cash and gone to work in consultancy and LU could have profited from this instead. Tenders are evaluated by technical people as well as project people and finance people. Inevitably price plays a very large part with all the public scrutiny and even once the price is agreed the scope adjustment (usually downwards) continues right through the project as timescales become challenging. I doubt this is any different to most other companies. No doubt some people want to see good old London Transport spending whatever it wishes on gold plated solutions but that world has long since gone. There are, of course, lots of lessons to learn from this signalling project, some of which would have been obvious from the start.
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Post by railtechnician on Jul 12, 2014 9:40:01 GMT
I'm not in any way suggesting the report is perfect but your view is quite as one sided as the report you criticise. The reality is that there are plenty of knowledgeable and experienced engineers and operators in London Underground still. LTI is a bit of a red herring (though I do think LU should still be selling its skills around the world). Many of the people who have left have taken a big packet of cash and gone to work in consultancy and LU could have profited from this instead. Tenders are evaluated by technical people as well as project people and finance people. Inevitably price plays a very large part with all the public scrutiny and even once the price is agreed the scope adjustment (usually downwards) continues right through the project as timescales become challenging. I doubt this is any different to most other companies. No doubt some people want to see good old London Transport spending whatever it wishes on gold plated solutions but that world has long since gone. There are, of course, lots of lessons to learn from this signalling project, some of which would have been obvious from the start. Of course my view is one sided, it cannot be anything but biassed and in that regard I can say no more than that my opinion is bound by knowledge gained as an insider over four decades working under various regimes. LTI is not a red herring, there was a point to be made and you understood the point perfectly, hence your proper remark about the golden handshakes. An incompetent not fit for purpose government sought to remove a millstone from around its neck, the embarrassment of a negative balance sheet in the public finances led to many incompetent decisions, not least of which was building scores of new hospitals under totally unaffordable PFI schemes but which included the Underground PPP. An exercise which cost far more in real terms than the alternatives and for which the politicians that presided over it should be held to account. Even now most £taxpayers will not understand how they have been fleeced in terms of value for money. The Underground Make or Buy reviews of the late 1980s were the beginning of the process of the government washing its hands and under the Tories I expect that had they remained in power we would now have a privatised fragmented Underground system instead of a publicly owned one. There are pros and cons to that just as there are pros and cons to a publicly owned and operated Underground but the PPP gave us the worst of both worlds simultaneously and created a golden opportunity for some to make hay while the sun shone briefly as the treasury opened the public purse long enough to ditch the Underground at any cost. Of course it didn't ditch the Underground at all but the move did get it removed from the balance sheet and also made many people quite rich as thousands of man years of technical knowledge, experience and competence was not only allowed to leave but was positively encouraged to do so on Friday and return to work as a contractor on Monday, some even sitting at the same desks but all costing more per hour to employ. Many of course formed the cores of the new contract companies, not just top level engineers but also time served experienced and skilled men from the sharp end too, not just from signalling but from all engineering departments that had not already been sold off in the 1980s i.e. data networks, power generation & distribution and HT mains staff. Underground devolution to lines was another costly step in the multiplication of middle management on the operations side of the business with hundreds of new managers directly recruited from areas such as retail management as well as bright and shiny new graduates but barely any from a transport organisation and few if any railwaymen. At the sharp end, for some 10 years from 1992/3 until 2002/3 and the actual full outsourcing of signalling work, the few staff still directly employed had to continually 'pickup and make good' after many errors made by the new contractors as they learnt their trade 'on the job' while they earned 'big bucks'. Along the way projects such as JLE were never completed to specification as they ran out of money and were unable to dot the 'i's and cross the 't's. The question I would ask is one that will never be truthfully answered by any politician or anyone at the top of LUL. "Just how much money has been spent on the Underground since 1990, how much of it was £taxpayers billions, and exactly where was it all spent?" There is no doubt that one gets what one pays for and that quality costs. It seems to me that the people who determine what is cost effective in real terms are simply not qualified to make such decisions because whether they are knowledgeable in any useful way or not they are all bound to short termism by the politicians, the politicians being people who are interested more in their own public image than anything they were supposedly democratically elected to effect. It is simply wrong to run different stocks on different lines and wrong to have different signalling systems using different components on different lines, that is, however, not to say that there should not be any differences. There is no real reason not to have a single set of standards from which all situations can be catered for from the same basic sets of building blocks. However, it would require London Underground and all the manufacturers of rolling stock, signalling and other equipment to come together and to create and agree common standards and common components. Further there would need to be full compatibility and interchangeability of components. Economies of scale and reduction of costs would be the result, recycling would also be even more viable. Unfortunately LUL seemingly has no clout these days and has to buy off the shelf what is available when it would once have led the way by designing and building its own or getting others to build to its designs. The corporate image is just a large umbrella concealing a very fragmented and not very efficient empire. There are so many ways that it could do better but it just doesn't seem to possess the expertise these days as the emphasis is all about operating rather than that which enables efficient operation.
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Post by Deleted on Jul 12, 2014 14:56:42 GMT
I would not disagree that in almost all ways PPP created more problems than it solved. However, with the government approach at the time, there wasn't going to be any other way that LUL got enough money for investment. That investment has resulted in new trains and signalling on the Victoria line, new signalling on the Jubilee and Northern and new trains on the sub surface lines. That's the positive legacy. It would obviously have been more cost effective if that was done by direct investment rather than PPP but LU wasn't trusted to deliver (and with lengthy and troubled projects like Central line ATO and the Jubilee extension that isn't especially surprising).
LUL invested much time and effort in creating or updating a set of standards prior to PPP to ensure consistency but in reality there were so many points of argument or potential loopholes that only served to make lawyers rich and allow the PPP companies to claim that the reason their costs were so high was LU's gold plating and their own "innovative" solutions being constrained.
Yes, many people moved across from LU to the Infracos and now most are back again!
Some of those people from outside have added value and diversity of view and really LU's customer focus is a world away from where it was in the 70s and 80s. Service delays, for example. are substantially lower than for many years and line performance on upgraded lines like the Vic and Jubilee has unquestionably improved. We're never going to return to the days where LU could dictate to the marketplace and to politicians. For those of us still within LU we can only do the best we can for our customers and colleagues and make the best possible decisions within the constraints we have. Looking back and reminiscing doesn't take us anywhere.
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Post by railtechnician on Jul 12, 2014 18:18:22 GMT
I would not disagree that in almost all ways PPP created more problems than it solved. However, with the government approach at the time, there wasn't going to be any other way that LUL got enough money for investment. That investment has resulted in new trains and signalling on the Victoria line, new signalling on the Jubilee and Northern and new trains on the sub surface lines. That's the positive legacy. It would obviously have been more cost effective if that was done by direct investment rather than PPP but LU wasn't trusted to deliver (and with lengthy and troubled projects like Central line ATO and the Jubilee extension that isn't especially surprising). LUL invested much time and effort in creating or updating a set of standards prior to PPP to ensure consistency but in reality there were so many points of argument or potential loopholes that only served to make lawyers rich and allow the PPP companies to claim that the reason their costs were so high was LU's gold plating and their own "innovative" solutions being constrained. Yes, many people moved across from LU to the Infracos and now most are back again! Some of those people from outside have added value and diversity of view and really LU's customer focus is a world away from where it was in the 70s and 80s. Service delays, for example. are substantially lower than for many years and line performance on upgraded lines like the Vic and Jubilee has unquestionably improved. We're never going to return to the days where LU could dictate to the marketplace and to politicians. For those of us still within LU we can only do the best we can for our customers and colleagues and make the best possible decisions within the constraints we have. Looking back and reminiscing doesn't take us anywhere. I wouldn't argue with much of that but I have to say that inverting the pyramid in terms of the management:staff ratio has not been good for the passenger (I hate calling the travelling public customers and customer focus is a euphemism for operating train services, nothing new in that except perhaps that for some it's more difficult to buy tickets) in terms of service performance or reliability, one of the most commonly reported problems revolves around poor dissemination of correct information during incidents and delays. One cannot help but think of too many cooks none of whom are privy to the full recipe. Looking back into history, much was done in the 20th century to mitigate service delays and provide a level of service that with all the recent upgrades LUL seems unable to match so far in the 21st century. So much of that is due in no small part to the way in which the implementation of health & safety legislation and political correctness have allowed so many to abdicate responsibility for their actions making it very difficult to pinpoint exactly where and with whom the buck stops for anything. This is compounded by the culture which aims to protect the corporate image no matter what, heads do not roll, although they may get shunted into side offices to mark time indefinitely where everything they do is benign, but are quietly replaced. Of course that culture is a well established carry over from the good old days of LT and much less visible in the top heavy corporate structure of today.
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Post by norbitonflyer on Jul 23, 2014 22:35:27 GMT
It is simply wrong to run different stocks on different lines and wrong to have different signalling systems using different components on different lines, On a network as big as LU, it is inevitable, unless you want to still be building and running Gate Stock on lines still signalled to Edwardian standards! LU does not have the money to replace everything at once, and even if it did, the train manufacturing industry does not have the capacity - and if it did, it would be doing nothing for 35 years or more between renewals - hardly a viable business model. 2009 stock is different from 1972 stock because it incorporates 35 years of technical development.
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Post by Deleted on Jul 23, 2014 22:50:11 GMT
I think Mr RT is referring too is that yes have different systems but atleast make them compatible. The original SSR plan was to have the Bombardier system called Cityflo but on JNP it was going to be the Thales Seltrac system which neither are compatible with each other. I.e the Met can no longer run down the Jubilee and vice versa and the same would of occured between the District and Picc.
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Post by Deleted on Jul 23, 2014 23:06:24 GMT
I think there are good points on both sides. Especially with ATO/P/C/etc. it would obviously have been silly for the Central to have the same system as the Vic when it was the Central's turn to go ATO and it probably wouldn't have been that smart to use either on the Northern or the Jubilee, etc. etc. Even cross-compatibility can be a bit of a nuisance I imagine (particularly with very old systems) and may limit the amount of newfangled handy gismos and functions you can have (at least at the same cost).
What, however, is a very good idea is to try to make sure that lines which have useful connections to each other (e.g. the Met and Jubilee) do have systems which are compatible so that trains can still be run on both without an almighty fuss needing to be made. I mean this for fairly regularly used, useful connections, like the Met and Jubilee and the District and Picc between Acton Town and Hammersmith. I don't really mean the Bakerloo and Jubilee or the Northern and Picc. Obviously if lines actually share tracks they have to be compatible (e.g. the Uxbridge branch (Met and Picc)). The case for this is all the more compelling when you consider that the Northern & Jubilee were due for resignalling around the same sort of time as the SSR, but we have PPP to thank for the fact that a unified system wasn't sought more than the march of technology.
Meanwhile I'm just gonna be in the corner mourning over the fact that TBTC seems to have won over DTG-R...
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Post by Deleted on Jul 24, 2014 11:38:26 GMT
I think Mr RT is referring too is that yes have different systems but atleast make them compatible. The original SSR plan was to have the Bombardier system called Cityflo but on JNP it was going to be the Thales Seltrac system which neither are compatible with each other. I.e the Met can no longer run down the Jubilee and vice versa and the same would of occured between the District and Picc. The original SSR resignalling plan by Metronet was Westinghouse DTG-R, Tube Lines went for Seltrac TBTC. TfL then retendered the SSR contract and selected Cityflo 650, if compatibility was important for TfL then I'm not quite sure why they didn't just go for TBTC. Meanwhile I'm just gonna be in the corner mourning over the fact that TBTC seems to have won over DTG-R... Would DTG-R still have been an option on offer by Siemens in 2014 though?
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Post by Deleted on Jul 24, 2014 13:46:52 GMT
The trains on the Picc was going to be fitted with the signalling for SSL be it DTG-R or the Cityflo system but as now have pulled out / let go this wont be a option. Remember the money that has been wasted in the past few years and the money spent just to get these S stock trains to run on convential signalling systems is millions.
Also at the time Metronet was made up from Bombardier and Westinghouse
Tubelines also had Siemans hence the different systems.
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Post by Tom on Jul 24, 2014 16:30:26 GMT
[Would DTG-R still have been an option on offer by Siemens in 2014 though? Almost certainly, unless they were looking to introduce something from Germany.
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Post by Deleted on Jul 24, 2014 17:55:37 GMT
[Would DTG-R still have been an option on offer by Siemens in 2014 though? Almost certainly, unless they were looking to introduce something from Germany. Concrete at the ready
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Post by Deleted on Jul 25, 2014 17:10:10 GMT
The original SSR resignalling plan by Metronet was Westinghouse DTG-R, Tube Lines went for Seltrac TBTC. TfL then retendered the SSR contract and selected Cityflo 650, if compatibility was important for TfL then I'm not quite sure why they didn't just go for TBTC. I think this is covered in the KPMG doc - at the time of signing the contract both Victoria and Jubilee were not delivering 100% successfully so it would have been a difficult choice to make.
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