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Post by paterson00 on Aug 22, 2010 22:37:33 GMT
I am due to sit a 3C verification course soon and would like to know what qualities a good verification tester would have over someone who did the job badly. Does anyone have any tips or pit falls to avoid?
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Tom
Administrator
Signalfel?
Posts: 4,196
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Post by Tom on Aug 22, 2010 23:12:28 GMT
Attention to detail. As a verification tester, what you do is the foundation for everyone else's testing. If you miss something, it may not be found by the people testing after you.
Consider a scenario where a contact is wired in back to front. The verification tester should find this either by buzzing, hand tracing or wire count (assuming the wire count is 2 and 1, not the same on each contact). If he misses it, will the functional tester notice? Possibly not, depending on what the circuit does. If the error inadvertently adds logic to a circuit, it should be found, likewise if it removes logic. If however it was just an option in a parallell path, it may go undetected. Will the Principles Tester find it? Possibly not, unless it adds or removes logic. Remember that the principles tester tests that the system as a whole works and complies with established principles - their testing is at a considerably higher level.
Remember that adequate Verification Testing (i.e. a wire count) would have prevented Clapham. That should give you an idea as to the criticality of the role.
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Deleted
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Post by Deleted on Aug 23, 2010 1:47:38 GMT
Before Terminal 5 wascommissioned it suddenly becam apparent that something was amiss. 10,000 connections had to be manually checked taking about two weeks. It transpired that a pair of wires had been wrongly connected but only showed up in service with a particular combination of signal/points positions. Fortunately this was discovered while the Instructor Ops were being trained on the route so no real damage to revenues.
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Post by railtechnician on Aug 23, 2010 14:20:15 GMT
Before Terminal 5 wascommissioned it suddenly becam apparent that something was amiss. 10,000 connections had to be manually checked taking about two weeks. It transpired that a pair of wires had been wrongly connected but only showed up in service with a particular combination of signal/points positions. Fortunately this was discovered while the Instructor Ops were being trained on the route so no real damage to revenues. Sounds impressive of course but as we know 10,000 connections is small beer in many ways and the signal department has always managed to manually check hundreds of things at hundreds of sites when anything potentially dangerous is discovered. In that regard nothing really changed when signalling installation and maintenance was outsourced as the separate companies remained closely tied to one another and to LUL. Of course some wiring errors are not discovered for years despite routine operation, functional testing and maintenance. One case that I recall occurred at South Harrow during a colleague's IRSE Signalling Tester assessment where a wiring error on a relay top that had existed for years was discovered during the signal selection proving. It is of course bad when an error becomes apparent immediately following an otherwise successful changeover. Wood Green stage 1 in the late1970s was such an example. It was Sunday morning, the changeover was done and dusted but there were problems with the electronic TD which was relatively new at the time (having been on trial at Earls Court) so most of the 100+ staff on site had returned to depot but a few of us remained assisting our supervisors and the TD lineman. The first reverser came in ran into the siding leaving the points tracklocked and following trains beginning to be queued in the northbound tunnel within a fairly short while. The Chief installation supervisor was still on site, as was the DO Tester, and went to investigate, the upshot was that F&G tracks had been reversed somehow sometime prior to the changeover. This went unnoticed by the Tester on the changeover but the incident had instant and lasting repercussions for the installation supervisor deemed to be responsible and for the way in which future jobs were undertaken. My recollection is that Wood Green was one of the first changeovers I worked on where the outside responses were not done on the night but in advance in the preceding week by night staff while day staff were still doing some wiring in the temporary relay room (which was replacing Wood Green cabin). Interestingly the ticket strip used to temporarily label the 1BA fuse bays had had F & G tracks crossed out and swapped over presumably by the day staff that were installing the track dropping boards in preparation for the changeover but the night signal supervisor was the one formerly disciplined. I couldn't stress more the need to check everything just as much when routinely replacing a relay or other equipment as when installing anything from new.
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