rincew1nd
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Post by rincew1nd on Mar 26, 2010 20:40:42 GMT
Ahhhh mon petit biscuit-fabricant, six recommendations covering five areas. There are two recommendations covering issuing medical advice to managers.
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Post by singaporesam on Mar 28, 2010 7:40:15 GMT
Am I only one , or does anybody else feel that the RAIB reports on LUL incidents are pitched at a lower intelligence level than their norm. They seem to feel the need to explain every single difference between LUL and the mainline in detail that a 10 year old could understand, and to be much more condescending in their recommendations to LUL compared to those for Network rail.
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Deleted
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Post by Deleted on Mar 28, 2010 9:32:31 GMT
Am I only one , or does anybody else feel that the RAIB reports on LUL incidents are pitched at a lower intelligence level than their norm. You are correct. In fact the entire report appears to have been written by some sixth-former from school who has never encountered the rail industry before, made their interviewees explain every item, and then just wrote it down. The number of quite apparent errors also shows it was never checked by anyone who knew what they were talking about. I spotted a couple in just a few minutes reading. Like the diagrams on page 9 persistently show the relevant insulated joint on the wrong track. The RAIB was modelled on the AAIB from the aviation industry, whose reports are a master of professionalism in comparison. It's a good job that the RAIB staff do not have any responsibility for actually operating any railway, as in this case there would be stupid accidents every day.
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Post by 100andthirty on Mar 28, 2010 10:08:01 GMT
There is absolutely no doubt that RAIB need to explain differences between LU and main line, and that have to explain assuming quite a low level of knowledge. Some of their audience are neither railway people, nor engineers. In the main line industry there's a pretty low level of knowledge of metro practice in general and LU in particular. In my experience, LU knowledge of main line is higher than vice versa.
that said, this incident - albeit with high potential consequences - seemed far too small to warrant an investigation that takes nearly a year to report, especially when LU's investigations are usually thorough and, by comparison, speedy.
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Chris M
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Post by Chris M on Mar 28, 2010 15:34:19 GMT
The point of the RAIB carrying out the investigation was, AIUI, not because of the actual consequences but because of the potential consequences. The RAIB report also has to investigate whether there are any potential implications for other rail operators in the UK, which the LU one does not. After all a signal protecting a converging flat junction passed at danger is an occurrence that can potentially occur at a very large number of places around the country. Also they were right to examine the actions of all concerned and the procedures that were in place to see whether they could be improved and/or whether there were implications for best practice for other railways.
I disagree that the LU reports are pitched lower than other reports, I suspect that it just appears this way because they cover a subject matter in which you have a much higher level of knowledge. I am neither an engineer nor a railway worker of any sort, and I find the RAIB reports consistently written at a level I can understand. This is a good thing as politicians, general media and non-specialist managers are some of the target audiences of the reports.
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Phil
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RIP 23-Oct-2018
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Post by Phil on Mar 28, 2010 18:20:38 GMT
Chris has a point. The RAIB looks objectively at the situation to see if there were things that had not been spotted but, if they had, could obviously have been improved.
In this case, nobody had ever thought that a track circuit block so far in advance of a stop signal protecting a junction could be a hazard - but it was! It meant that a train could SPAD the signal but not trip the track circuit and lock up the whole junction automatically (as opposed to what is almost universal elsewhere). It also meant that the signaller did not know EXACTLY where the incident train was when giving further instructions (though that bit didn't matter as it worked out).
LU had lived with that for years and never thought about it (and that's not a criticism BTW). But RAIB can make 'recommendations' which are in effect instructions so that LU, now aware of the danger, cannot decide to live with it a bit longer. That's what RAIB are there for and if you read the reports including the NR ones you see they do an excellent job - so much better than the old unlamented H&S Executive investigation era.
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Post by railtechnician on Mar 28, 2010 20:14:25 GMT
Chris has a point. The RAIB looks objectively at the situation to see if there were things that had not been spotted but, if they had, could obviously have been improved. In this case, nobody had ever thought that a track circuit block so far in advance of a stop signal protecting a junction could be a hazard - but it was! It meant that a train could SPAD the signal but not trip the track circuit and lock up the whole junction automatically (as opposed to what is almost universal elsewhere). It also meant that the signaller did not know EXACTLY where the incident train was when giving further instructions (though that bit didn't matter as it worked out). LU had lived with that for years and never thought about it (and that's not a criticism BTW). But RAIB can make 'recommendations' which are in effect instructions so that LU, now aware of the danger, cannot decide to live with it a bit longer. That's what RAIB are there for and if you read the reports including the NR ones you see they do an excellent job - so much better than the old unlamented H&S Executive investigation era. I find it interesting that the main blame has fallen upon a track circuit especially as I know that area, it having been in my maintenance area. The train would've been on the Earl's Court signaller's diagram looking as if it was waiting at WM1 ! I can't help wondering what the control room technical officer might've been doing assuming a TO still mans the control room. Before the signaller or anyone else could make a decision about a course of action I have always thought that the position of a train following a SPAD had to be clearly established, clearly it was not else the incident might've been handled properly. Still the report has reached a conclusion and made its recommendations so there is no more to be said.
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Post by citysig on Mar 28, 2010 21:11:39 GMT
I find it interesting that the main blame has fallen upon a track circuit especially as I know that area, it having been in my maintenance area. It forms part of the blame, but if you read this report plus a number of internal reports, the picture is a little wider. Before the signaller or anyone else could make a decision about a course of action I have always thought that the position of a train following a SPAD had to be clearly established, clearly it was not else the incident might've been handled properly. And that is one of the elements that forms part of the wider picture.
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Tom
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Post by Tom on Mar 28, 2010 21:30:07 GMT
Am I only one , or does anybody else feel that the RAIB reports on LUL incidents are pitched at a lower intelligence level than their norm. You are correct. In fact the entire report appears to have been written by some sixth-former from school who has never encountered the rail industry before, made their interviewees explain every item, and then just wrote it down. It does seem to be written at a certain level. However, I do believe that this is because of the differences between Metro and Main Line operation. Having spent some time working with staff new to the Metro environment, but with many years of Main Line experience, there is a big difference and moving from one to the other can be quite a culture shock! In this case, nobody had ever thought that a track circuit block so far in advance of a stop signal protecting a junction could be a hazard - but it was! I must say I disagree with you - people had thought about it. Signal replacing distances are explicitly specified in LU Engineering Standards, complete with an explanation as to why the distances specified are chosen. The distance for a controlled signal is between 3 and 15m - these values are chosen so that (3m) a minor overrun does not cause site lockup, but anything more can be detected, and (15m) because anyhting longer gives rise to this sort of incident! This is where I earn my money as a Principles Tester - taking a design and looking at the possible problems and scenarios which could rise to a hazard within it, then testing to see how the problem has been addressed.
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Tom
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Post by Tom on Mar 28, 2010 21:39:42 GMT
I find it interesting that the main blame has fallen upon a track circuit especially as I know that area, it having been in my maintenance area. It forms part of the blame, but if you read this report plus a number of internal reports, the picture is a little wider. I agree. It was a contributing factor, but the incident wouldn't have occured if the signaller had done things differently.
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Phil
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Post by Phil on Mar 28, 2010 22:05:11 GMT
It was a contributing factor, but the incident wouldn't have occured if the signaller had done things differently. And I too agree with that totally!
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