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Post by astock5000 on Apr 8, 2008 16:36:38 GMT
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Post by Tubeboy on Apr 8, 2008 18:28:30 GMT
I remember this, are not derailments rare on the DLR, at least outside the depots?
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Chris M
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Post by Chris M on Apr 8, 2008 19:01:31 GMT
I'm surprised that the RAIB haven't issued anything saying that they're investigating the incident as they normally look into derailments of passenger carrying trains.
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Post by suncloud on Apr 8, 2008 23:14:52 GMT
The rail operator is required to immediately notify the RAIB of "Derailments on lines open to traffic or which
block running lines open to traffic." They clearly don't investigate every occurrence reported to them, but as this falls in Schedule 1 (the more serious incidents) I'd imagine it will be, and they just haven't got around to announcing it yet (it's probably not their highest priority immediately following an incident).
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mrfs42
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Post by mrfs42 on Apr 9, 2008 2:12:15 GMT
<perhaps I shouldn't say this, but tongue very firmly in cheek>
Schedule 1?
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Post by Deleted on Apr 9, 2008 7:30:03 GMT
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Post by suncloud on Apr 9, 2008 10:05:06 GMT
Checking back on the recent email alerts, the RAIB seem to take typically 2/3 days to send out their investigation notification emails after the incident date. (Although they file the announcements by incident date rather than announcement date). There was one that came in over a month later though...
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Post by Chris M on Apr 9, 2008 11:14:12 GMT
I suspect the one that came in a month late was possibly an incident that was not required to be notified immediately.
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Post by suncloud on Apr 9, 2008 12:27:43 GMT
The two lengthiest delays between an incident and it's reporting from this year feature a derailment of engineering wagons/plant (presumably under possession, so it may or may not require immediate notification) and a fatal accident at a level crossing (which is reportable under schedule 1 unless it is trespass or suicide).
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Post by miztert on Apr 9, 2008 17:04:36 GMT
On the Friday morning of the incident I saw a RAIB 4x4 vehicle parked up next to Deptford Bridge DLR station, so I'd suggest that RAIB were indeed notified.
I don't get update emails from RAIB but from following past incidents it would appear there is a small time lag of a few days between an incident happening and being acknowledged on the RAIB website.
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Post by Chris M on Apr 13, 2008 13:15:58 GMT
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Post by suncloud on Apr 13, 2008 13:58:33 GMT
Doh, you beat me to it!  Interesting that it appears to be engineering kit left out. |
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Post by astock5000 on Apr 24, 2008 15:25:46 GMT
Interesting that it appears to be engineering kit left out. If that accident had happened on a network rail line, I wouldn't have been suprised. I thought that the people that work on the DLR weren't so stupid. |
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Post by c5 on Apr 24, 2008 15:30:08 GMT
Interesting that it appears to be engineering kit left out. If that accident had happened on a network rail line, I wouldn't have been suprised. I thought that the people that work on the DLR weren't so stupid.And it has happened a number of times on LUL! |
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Post by Deleted on Apr 24, 2008 22:22:17 GMT
My personal opinion is that on driverless systems the first train of the day should be empty.
This now happens on the manually driven monorail in Wuppertal in Germany, where there was a fatal accident on the first train of the day when it struck engineering kit left on the track.
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Post by astock5000 on Apr 25, 2008 19:12:13 GMT
Just have the first train driven manually.
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Post by suncloud on Apr 27, 2008 12:42:00 GMT
DLR trains are limited in manual mode... Is there a permissive manual mode?
The report will undoubtedly investigate whether the PSA was in a position to observe the obstruction, and whether they could have reasonably prevented or reduced the damaged caused.
They will presumably review whether the current operating procedures for the first train on a route are appropriate, and make suitable recommendations (i.e. recommending first trains run empty) that are safe, sufficient and reasonably practicable.
DLR are likely to go through a similar process internally, reviewing their risk assessments etc.
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Post by astock5000 on Apr 28, 2008 15:48:53 GMT
Or you could just have the PSA sitting at the front of the first train.
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mrfs42
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Post by mrfs42 on Jun 22, 2009 20:53:44 GMT
Rather than having two threads on the same subject: Today at 8:03pm, rincew1nd wrote:The Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB) has released its report into the derailment of a Docklands Light Railway train, near Deptford Bridge station on the 4 April 2008. The RAIB has made eleven recommendations. Clicky clicky I've also unlocked this thread, if anyone wants to comment. |
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Phil
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Post by Phil on Jun 24, 2009 8:11:34 GMT
It's the usual story of multiple lapses of care/procedure/communication/system setup etc. Just shows how safe the railways really are.
The great bit is a sideline in the detail though. The train took itself through a 30kph TSR at nearly 40. All the TSRs are entered manually on a computer, and have to be re-entered every time the computer is rebooted. Due to computer development work the system had been rebooted 4 times in 24 hours, and at least once after the TSR was re-entered that very morning. And nobody was responsible for telling the controller (the one who entered the data) that there had been a reboot...........
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Post by cetacean on Jun 24, 2009 9:07:13 GMT
It's the usual story of multiple lapses of care/procedure/communication/system setup etc. Just shows how safe the railways really are. That's a very generous assessment. The report depicts an organisation in complete disarray in terms of making and following safety procedures. Fortunately there's an expensive computer system that stops these buffoons harming anyone, though they're having a good crack at screwing that up too. |
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Post by thirstquensher on Jul 24, 2009 19:56:29 GMT
Quite. A Safety Change Paper being thrown out of review due to "formatting issues". Working for a company doing work for another well-known TfL mode, I know all too well how the reviewers of anything safety-related spend more time making comments about:
* What font the document is typed in,
* How thick or thin the table borders should be,
* Whose logos should be displayed and in what size,
* Perceived grammatical errors (even where there are none),
* Whether a given paragraph should or should not span a page boundary...
the list goes on in a similar fashion.
Very often re-drafts are made to 'correct' these 'issues' (which vary from reviewer to reviewer) and actual content issues get missed.
So that's why the 2nd sentence of paragraph 104 really made my blood boil.
If I was a government minister, and I had the power to introduce any changes to the law, one I would put before the Houses would be to make it mandatory that "all safety documents be reviewed in a plain text format devoid of aesthetic or branding considerations, such that the review of the meaning and purpose of the written content be unhindered by such issues; and that no reviewer shall cite such issues in relation to comments made as a result of the review". Any company should be then free to apply their particular branding to the document after review without recompense.
Don't get me wrong. I'm a fickle b*gger when it comes to getting documents formatted right and having them well-presented. I do think it's important and it shows a degree of care in the end product - that you're trying to produce something that's easy to use, interpret and implement.
Reviewers spending nearly all their time trying to assert their influence over the 'branding' of safety documentation however is a large contributory factor to the underlying causes of such incidents - i.e., poor communication, because these aesthetic and marketing issues always take precedence. It should be stamped out. It would make a world of difference.
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