Passengers for North Greenwich left high and dry

No they had never been opened, is what I think was being said.

As an ex-Jubilee driver, I think that unless it was a very very quiet time, the driver would usually find it unusual that nobody is getting on or off the train when he (thought he had) opened the doors. The only thing I can think of is that the driver arrived at the platform, pressed the open buttons, train doors opened but for some reason PEDs didnt, the driver then wasnt looking at the OPO screens, but maybe was doing something else. I.e. having a drink of tea, looking at his duty book, then about 10-15 seconds later he looked at the OPO screens, not realising the PEDS had never opened, and saw nobody getting on/off (they couldnt!) and thought it was time to go. Then made PA, pressed close, and went !

Basically a catalogue of errors (not checking the PSI (platform status indicator)) when opening doors, not observing customers board/alight, led to this happening. It was probably a newer driver, although of course it may not be!

How could so many new and inexperienced staff make so many catalogue mistakes (especially if they're hotfoot off the end of their training) be allowed to get concentrated within one area?

i.e. It is a very strange co-incidence for so many inobservant individuals all 'not noticing' something that should be so obvious, in an environment (and an area) where LUL staff are supposed to be *more* vigilant than usual, not the reverse.

What if this had been Canary Wharf we had been talking about, for instance? North Greenwich is only one stop away.

I was only slightly surprised at the time but, thinking about it now, I've actually started to feel a bit more angry. As the travelling public LUL and the BTP keep harping on at us to be more vigilant; how can staff be allowed to get to a point where they don't even notice the most basic, obvious things? Especially in rush hour. I wouldn't be surprised if someone told me that the station control room has no communication with the platform staff and no way of knowing if the platform doors fail to open. You would have thought though, that in this day and age, some sort of inhibit light could be triggered by the control room to say "something appears to be wrong, take a look back and see if you can see what it is".

Plus there ought to be some sort of inhibit signal in the cab (I know, I know, you're all going to tell me that there isn't) that keeps the train stopped until it's reset - if the door/platform interface doesn't go through its proper cycle.

I don't know enough about how the two systems interact, and I'm sure I'll learn that the two systems don't communicate with each other - but they should, and they should each provide a proper interlocking signal to each other to cause a *noticable* inhibit message to say "the proper cycle has not been completed". This should be something that the train operator can't just 'ignore' and drive away from - something might be *caught* in the doors, for instance.

Incidentally, on the Bakerloo line a couple of days ago, the doors were opened while the train was still decelarating into the station. It raced through the platform at a far faster speed than usual, braked more forcefully than usual, coming to rest right at the last minute with an alarmingly 'last-minute' feel, but the doors were opening whilst the train was still doing around 10 to 5 mph. Thankfully no-one was pressed up the door but, if they had been, they would have just fallen back and left to slam into and slide along the platform.

It just goes to show, you can have Rule Books and Standards and other safety briefings and booklets as long as your arm, but if common sense doesn't get a look-in, it's all fairly useless. I don't think anyone *really* knows what the words "Risk Assessment" *really* mean in the transport industry anymore - it simply seems to mean completing a contractual exercise - or rather, getting a "safety consultant" to complete a contractual exercise - than it does to simply have someone observe - or "ASSESS" - the everyday risks that are apparent when spotting poor and sloppy practices - and thinking about what the potential consequences can be.

RA's wouldn't exist at all if it hadn't been for the KX fire in '87. I'm sure even if they had been, and a mere paeon had piped up "well, what about the risk of burning ciggie ends falling through the escalators?" they would have been told, "well, it's never been an issue before, so shut up. We only need to include risks that HSQE have identified as the types of risk that need to be assessed. If it's not in their template RA, we don't need to bother with it. Why make more work for ourselves?"

What risks then, in 10 years' time, will be the ones that we look back on to say "well, they weren't considered then because they'd never been an issue before" (i.e. one that had caused an event that made the news, for very wrong reasons).

I've been on a C stock train that pulled into Whitechapel, stopped for 40 seconds without opening up and then moved off leaving baffled passengers on the platform and angry ones on the train, and the unfortunate t/op getting an earful from some suit at Stepney Green.

The train I was describing didn't detrain - I stayed on it all the way to Neasden!

I did once manage to leave Dagenham East eastbound without opening my doors - I pressed the buttons but apparently they didn't open. It was dark, and pouring with rain which would have drowned out the sound of the doors opening. Late in the evening it's not so unusual to have nobody get off at a station at the east end of the line.

Looking in the mirror at a very shallow angle down a straight platform edge, it isn't that obvious if the doors are open or closed - you're looking for people crossing the line from train to platform. The first I knew of it was when an irate passenger banged on my cab door at Elm Park!

So, it can be done! But in a tunnel section station with PEDs and in-cab monitors and good lighting conditions I would have thought it would be much more obvious to the driver.