Passengers self-detrain from LO train 15 July 2019

It seems like it might be similar to the incident at Lewisham a couple of winters ago, where if conditions become unbearable passengers take action rather than wait

Thankfully this is a very rare happening but its pretty obvious that simply telling passengers that its forbidden because its potentially dangerous will not stop them from taking such direct action.

What electric trains need is enough onboard power to travel short distances - even if at slow speed getting to the next station would reduce the potentially lethal consequences of passengers self-detraining at locations where such is just too dangerous.

Given that one of the prime dangers often stated in these incidents is that the track was live*, I don't think that would be a complete answer.



* Obviously, even if it isn't at one moment, it could be the next, so apparent lack of power to the train should never be considered a justification for unauthorised de-training.

Yes, the railway needs to realise that passengers will self-detrain and that there are exactly two things they can do to prevent it:
1: Get the train moving again before people leave it
2: Detrain them in a controlled manner before they do it themselves

How long you have to do either of these depends on many factors and varies from seconds (e.g. if the train (appears to be) on fire and the train is at a station) to many hours (e.g. there's a blizzard outside and there are no alternative transport options available nearby).

There are things you can do to increase the time available before people self-detrain, such as giving them timely, truthful and detailed information about what is happening, why and how long you expect to be before either 1 or 2 happens and keeping the environment on the train as comfortable as possible, but on a hot day in an urban area with an apparently easy route to alternative transport options visible you probably have at absolute most about an hour no matter what you do. In all situations though you need to start planning to do (2) as soon as there is a chance if there is a chance that (1) will not happen (if not sooner).

The reference to the line being "live" may be to the fact that other trains might be passing, rather than electrically live. But the report's title does say the line was "electrically live". I'm not sure exactly where the stranding took place, but North Pole Junction is a little way north of the changeover point from DC to AC, so any electrically live components would be several metres above the evacuees' heads.

Unusually, the changeover is done "on the fly" (there is, presumably, a reason the wires were not carried as far as Shepherds Bush?) and if a pantograph fails to rise the train's momentum may be enough to carry it beyond the end of the 3rd rail, leaving it stranded even if both the AC and DC power supplies are live. .

Here we go again - railway operators seemingly astonished to find passengers decide to behave like human beings rather than parcels!

I too am surprised this did not get picked up by at least the local newspapers.

Assuming this was a 5 car 378 then with only 186 seats available for the 500-600 passengers - it sounds the service was close to crush loading with 300+ standing somewhere along the train when it became stranded.

According to Accuweather the weather in Acton on the day was not extreme - warm yes but it only climbed to a high of 22 degrees so not alarmingly warm. Certainly not pleasant conditions to expect hundreds of passengers to be happy standing for any extended period especially if the power issue also resulted in the air conditioning failing. (PS it hit 27 degrees the next day - so this was not even heatwave territory).

As for how long people will wait before people will take matters into their own hands, as others have said it has many factors. But surely a "risk management" strategy should be based on assuming the worst, rather than optimistically assuming passengers on a train will be happy to wait until hell freezes over.

Sorry if Lewisham did not make this clear, surely this incident must increase pressure on Network Rail to have extra resources so they can gear up for far quicker intervention.

As others have said like it or not, people WILL eventually evacuate in a totally uncontrolled way. It is not IF it is simply when. Whilst that public response may be the absolute worse scenario for the railway timetable/logistics and costs perspective, for the 600 people on board, it obviously did provide a very understandable way to get out of a predicament which they otherwise had no control over.

I have no idea how long it took before doors were forced open in this instance - so even after 30 people had forced the doors open and got out onto the track it was still over 90 minutes before Network Rail decided it should shut off the power stop other trains and detrain the rest of the passengers. This really does not sound like the failed train was given enough priority.

I would be astonished if it was over 60 minutes after the train stopped before someone forced doors open to get off - regardless of how often they received reassuring communications from the driver.

It will be interesting to see who RAIB decide to focus on in this report. I really hope they can get away from "who was at fault" scenarios and instead get everyone involved to suggest what could have been done better/sooner, with the benefit of hindsight, to hopefully figure out how to prevent people ever reaching the point where they will self evacuate.

Definitely one to watch.

I think you might find that electrically live equipment will be a lot closer than several metres above people's heads if passengers are getting out of trains away from stations. Its not only the wires that contact the pantograph that are live. The supports connecting them to the stanchions are also live.

This image shows in red which bits are live - basically none of the bits that closer to a person than the contact wire is.

It's not the clearest image but it's the best I can find online. The clearest one I've seen was I think in the vestibule of a Voyager and showed clearly the live parts of OHLE and third rail.

I have just looked at NESA MD166 Seq 001. The section of line from just before NP Junc (in the direction heading towards Shepherd's Bush) is DC 3rd Rail and AC OHLE, to accommodate the voltage change for both SR and LO, (the AC extends to perhaps 450m? just before the LU viaduct) so if the train was in approx the NP Junc/St Quentin area then it was energised at both DC and AC. Do we know the exact spot the train was at?

I'm sure there are also bonds between the running rails and the neutral wire which are charged, though they are usually insulated so present less hazard to an evacuating passenger than they do to a member of the P-way gang with a spade.

And just before our resident pedants' burst into life, OHLE/OLE= Overhead Line Electrification. I have seen signage for both OLE and OHLE, but personally I prefer to call it OLÉ. Basically, it's the electric knitting up there somewhere.

If the running rails are also the return conductor (and "neutral"), then they're already at effectively at zero potential unless there's a hefty current in them at the time; then they're probably only a few volts above ground.  I'd be a lot more concerned about tripping hazards than electrical ones (as I understand from previous comments, this was in overhead-power-only territory; no 3rd or 4th rails).

Interestingly, after a spate of things being a bit rubbish on the Finsbury Pk - Welwyn trains (several days on the bounce of cancellations), there has been a determined effort on the part of someone to try to assuage passenger annoyance - apologetic ticket inspectors, trains making additional stops, and revenue protection fence gates being left open by staff rather than make a train of delayed passengers scrum through a two-gate gateline.

It could be coincidence, but maybe there is a realisation that taking a more conciliatory approach to passengers pays dividends (although it's probably the staff not wanting the abuse than anyone further up the tree making the change)

Quite so. The other challenge, with a DOO train is that the driver must protect their train as a priority and contact the necessary signalling, control and other authorities to appraise them of the situation and then in all probability be expected to keep a calm head and go through a number of technical/diagnostic procedures. During all of which, they can't also be making endless reassuring and accurate announcements.

DOO = Driver Only Operation

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